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Abstract—This paper analyzes the achievable throughput of
multi-hop sensor networks for industrial applications under
secrecy constraint. The evaluation scenario comprises sensors
that measure some relevant information of the plant that is first
processed by an aggregator node and then sent to the control
unit. To reach the control unit, a message may travel through
relay nodes, which form a multi-hop wireless link. At every hop,
eavesdropper nodes attempt to acquire the messages transmitted
through the legitimate link. The communication design problem
posed here is how to maximize the multi-hop throughput from
the aggregator to the control unit by finding the best combination
of relay positions (i.e. hop length: short or long) and coding rates
(i.e. high or low spectral efficiency) so that the secrecy constraint
is satisfied. Using a stochastic-geometry formulation, we show
that the optimal choice of coding rate is normally high and
depends on the path-loss exponent only, while a greater number
of shorter hops are preferable to smaller number of longer hops
in any situation. For the investigated scenarios, we prove that the
optimal throughput subject to the secrecy constraint achieves the
unconstrained optimal performance – if a feasible solution exists.
Index Terms—Multi-hop wireless networks, stochastic geom-
etry, machine-to-machine communications, throughput, secrecy
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial environment imposes challenging conditions on
radio propagation due to their commonplace reflective and
absorbent surfaces, as well as electromagnetic interference
from the machinery [1]. Recently, wireless solutions for in-
dustrial applications have gained considerable attention from
both academia and industry, using the concept of machine-to-
machine communications [2]–[6]. Such idea enables seamless
exchange of information between autonomous devices without
any (direct) human intervention. Another advantage of wireless
machine-to-machine communications is its scalability, which
reduces deployment and maintenance costs.
In industrial plants, exchange of information is often needed
among the machinery, monitoring devices and control unit;
thereby, reliability, low latency and security become major
concerns in the communication system design [7]. In this con-
text, multi-hop machine-to-machine communications appear as
a promising technology to tackle the industrial environment
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challenges. As pointed out in [3], multi-hop schemes are more
suitable in such environments with additional interference.
In a typical plant, the design of a multi-hop link between the
aggregator and the control unit can be simplified by setting two
parameters: position of relay nodes and coding rate (spectral
efficiency). The most straightforward design option would be
to use long-hops (less use of network resources) and to set
high coding rates (i.e. more efficient messages in bits/s/Hz).
Industrial networks usually employ unlicensed frequency
bands and consequently are exposed to stronger co-channel
interference. If this is the case, using long hops in conjunction
with high rates may not be the best choice as far as the former
leads to lower signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) while the latter
leads to higher SIR thresholds needed to successfully decode
a message [8].
In large industrial deployments, there are various sensors
and machines continuously monitoring several processes. The
resulting information that needs to be exchanged is frequently
confidential, what requires the communication to be reliable,
efficient, and secure at all levels of the network infrastructure
[7], [9]. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium,
non-intended nodes – commonly named eavesdroppers –
within the communication range of a given transmitter can
overhear the so-called legitimate transmission and possibly
extract private information [9]. To avoid that, cryptographic
techniques are usually implemented in the higher layers of
the communication protocols to ensure confidentiality [10].
Such techniques, however, depend on secret keys and rely
on the limited computational power of eavesdroppers, as well
as the reliability guaranteed by channel coding at the physical-
layer design. These assumptions may not always hold since
devices with high computational power are getting cheaper and
widespread. Moreover, they become expensive and difficult
to achieve as the network scales [9], [11]. In this context,
physical-layer security comes as a promising alternative to
complement cryptographic solutions, by adding not only se-
curity at the physical-layer with strategies that guarantee
reliability, but also confidentiality regardless of eavesdroppers
computational power [9], [11].
Another interesting solution when dealing with wireless
communication over multiple hops is the well-known coopera-
tive relaying strategies [12], [13]. As pointed out in [12], such
schemes are robust to fading and interference impairments
due to the enhanced diversity. Additionally, as discussed in
[14], [15], cooperative diversity schemes also enhance the
performance of networks secured at the physical-layer.
All in all, the existence of multiple hops, interferers and
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Fig. 1. Schematic example of the proposed scenario. The black node is the
aggregator (source), the blue node is the control unit (destination) and the
green nodes are the relays, all of them defining the legitimate link. The white
nodes are the interferers while the red nodes are the eavesdroppers, which
attempt to illegitimately acquire the messages send through the multi-hop
link. The network designer aims at maximizing the multi-hop throughput by
properly deploying the relays and setting the coding rate used while respecting
a given secrecy constraint.
eavesdroppers further complicate the design of wireless com-
munication systems in industrial applications. Fig. 1 exem-
plifies an industrial deployment, where several sensors com-
municate to an aggregator (black node), which by its turn
communicates via relays with the control unit (blue node). For
instance, an aggregator can act as a relay and help to convey
the information to the control unit. The legitimate link is
composed by an aggregator (black node), relays (green nodes)
and the control unit (blue node). All other randomly distributed
nodes in the network are assumed to be either interferers
(white nodes) or (potential) eavesdroppers (red nodes).
We assume that sensors are scattered throughout the in-
dustrial facility to measure relevant information, which is
processed by an aggregator node and then sent to the control
unit. Note that the sensor measurements, their communication
with the aggregetor and the information processing are all
assumed to be perfect. To reach the control unit, the message
may travel through relay nodes, forming a multi-hop, wireless
link. At every hop, eavesdropper nodes attempt to acquire the
messages transmitted through the legitimate link.
For instance, the aggregator could attempt a single trans-
mission via long hops, which means that the channel is used
less times and then there is a lower chance of the message
being decoded by the eavesdropper. At the same time this
increases the chance that an eavesdropper, which is closer
to the transmitter than the desired receiver, intercepts and
acquires the information being transmitted.
As we can observe, there are trade-offs regarding possible
eavesdropper locations, number of hops, transmit power and
decoding capabilities, which are function of the interference
level perceived at the receivers. To assess such trade-offs,
we introduce a tractable model based on to characterize the
uncertainty related to interferers (jammers) and eavesdroppers
positions and then proceed with a throughput optimization
subject to a secrecy constraint. Then, the main contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Analysis of the throughput of industrial communication
networks under a secrecy constraint by employing a
model that characterizes the uncertainty related to inter-
ferers’ and eavesdroppers’ positions.
• Closed-form solutions for the optimal multi-hop through-
put considering or not the secrecy constraint as a function
of network deployments parameters.
• Identification of the operational regions proving that
the optimal throughput subject to the secrecy constraint
achieves the optimal performance if a feasible solution
exists.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces the system model and the main metrics used
to evaluate the performance of the network. Section III and
Section IV evaluate the trade-offs involved in the design and
deployment of the network. Both sections offer comprehensive
numerical results and discussions. Next, Section V contextu-
alizes our results and current industrial standards. Finally, in
Section VI conclusions and final remarks are drawn.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let D > 0 be the distance from the aggregator to the
central unit, assuming that there exist in-between relay nodes
employing a decode-and-forward strategy [12]. We consider
that the relay nodes are deployed in the straight line defined
by the aggregator and the central unit such that the distance
d > 0 between any two nodes is the same. The number of
hops is then computed as h = D/d. We assume that randomly
scattered nodes attempt to jam the communication between the
aggregator and the central unit. Then, if we assume that the
jamming signals experienced by each receiver node along the
multi-hop link are independent, the respective throughput T ,
with respect to the multi-hop link, can be computed as [8]:
T = log(1 + β)
h
(Psuc)
h, (1)
where Psuc is the probability that the message is successfully
decoded by the receiver and β > 0 is the minimum required
SIR for a successful reception. If we assume point-to-point
Gaussian codes and interference-as-noise decoding rule [16],
the spectral efficiency of log(1 +β), measured in bits/s/Hz, in
the single-hop links is achievable if SIR> β.
If the network designer choose one long hop h = 1, the
throughput is log(1 + β) Psuc. If more hops are desired, then
more network resources are required and the overall spectral
efficiency decreases in relation to the number of hops (i.e.
the same information is transmitted at the expense of more
channel uses). Nevertheless, if more hops are added, Psuc is
expected to increase. These contradictory effects are captured
by (1).
We assume a field of jammers (malicious interferers) that is
characterized by a 2-dimension uniform Poisson point process
Φint with intensity λint > 0, measured in transmitters per unit
of area [17]. We assume that the channel has two components:
one related to the distance-dependent path-loss such that the
received power decays with the distance and other related
to fading. The received power at the node of interested can
be computed as gir−αi , where ri is the distance between the
3reference receiver and the ith node, gi is the channel gain
between them, and α > 2 the path-loss exponent [18].
We consider the communication occurs in time-slot basis
so that the slot length is the time required to transmit one
packet [19]. If the nodes’ positions and the channel gains
do not change during the packet transmission, the signal-to-
interference ratio (SIR) is computed as1
SIR =
g0d
−α∑
i∈Φint
gir
−α
i
. (2)
To compute Psuc, we assume that the channel gains gi are
independent and identically distributed exponential random
variables (Rayleigh fading) and that the interferers’ positions
change every time slot. In this way, each time-slot is a different
realization of the point processes Φint and the channel gains
gi. From this assumptions, the success probability is [17]:
Psuc = e
−λintκpid2β2/α , (3)
where κ = Γ(1 + 2/α)Γ(1− 2/α).
Let us now consider that there are eavesdroppers that are
capable of decoding the transmitted messages if the SIR expe-
rienced by them are greater than the threshold βeav > 0.2 Their
spatial distribution are modeled as a 2-dimensional uniform
Poisson point process Φeav with intensity λeav > 0, measured
in eavesdroppers per unit of area. The channel gains in relation
to the transmitter are modeled as in the interferers’ process
described above (quasi-static Rayleigh fading and distance-
dependent path-loss). As before, a different realization of
the point process and channel gains are assumed at every
different time-slot. In this scenario, due to the lack of any side
information regarding the specific position and the channel
gains, it is not possible to guarantee 100% of secrecy in the
communication of the desired link.
Herein, we assume a secrecy constraint referring to the
aggregator–control unit multi-hop link. In this case, the proba-
bility that the eavesdropper illegitimately acquires the message
should be, statistically, lower than or equal to %. To compute
such probability, we need to evaluate the outage probability in
the eavesdropper3. The probability density function fR1(r) of
distance r between an arbitrary point to the closest point of a
Poisson point process with intensity λeav is given by [17]:
fR1(r) = λeav 2pire
−λeavpir2 . (4)
Similarly to (3), the outage probability Pout:eav (i.e. the
probability that the packet is not successfully decoded) at the
1We assume here interference-limited networks. As pointed in [20], the
inclusion of the noise power leads to a more complex analysis without
providing any significant qualitative difference.
2This threshold may reflect how powerful are the eavesdroppers: a low βeav
indicates that the eavesdroppers are able to successfully decode messages even
with low SIR, reflecting a powerful decoding scheme.
3In fact this is an approximation since there will be closer eavesdroppers
that experience a better channel. This, however, is a good approximation and
holds in most of the cases for the spatial densities considered here.
eavesdropper can be computed as [17]:
Pout:eav = Er
[
1− e−λintκpir2(βeav)2/α
]
=
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α + λeav
, (5)
where Er [·] is the expected value in regard to the distance r
given by (4).
We are now ready to state the optimization problem of
interest as follows: what are the hop length d and SIR
threshold β that jointly optimize the multi-hop throughput
T given by (1) while the secrecy constraint  is satisfied?
Mathematically, we have the following:
max
(β,d)
T = d log(1 + β)
D
(
e−λintκpid
2β2/α
)D/d
s.t.
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α + λeav
)D/d
≥ 1− 
, (6)
where the constraint is the probability that the eavesdropper
links are in outage at every hop of the multi-hop link with a
probability greater than equal to 1− .
III. UNCONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION
Let us start presenting the solution of the unconstrained
optimization problem assuming that the number of hops h
can be a real number so that the hop length d can assume any
positive value for a given D.
Proposition 1: The pair (β∗, d∗) of the unconstrained ver-
sion of the optimization problem given by (6) is:
β∗ = −1 + eW0(−α2 e−α/2)+α2 (7)
d∗ =
1
Dλintκpi(β∗)2/α
, (8)
where W0(·) is the principal branch of the Lambert W
function4 [19], which is defined as x = W0(x)eW0(x) such
that x ≥ −e−1 and W0(x) ≥ −1.
The optimal throughput T ∗ is then:
T ∗ =
log
(
eW0(−
α
2 e
−α/2)+α2
)
e log(2)Dλintκpi
(
−1 + eW0(−α2 e−α/2)+α2
) . (9)
Outline of proof: The first step is to show that multi-hop
throughput T in (6) is a quasi-concave function in terms of
both d and β. Then, the pair (β∗, d∗) that leads to the optimal
unconstrained throughput T ∗ can be found as the joint solution
of the following partial derivative equations ∂T /∂d = 0 and
∂T /∂β = 0.
Solving that system of equation, we find the equilibrium
point (β∗, d∗) that is given by (7) and (8). Inserting these
values into multi-hop throughput given by (6), we obtain
equation (9).
Fig. 2 exemplifies how the optimal throughput T ∗ varies
with the density of interferers λint for different multi-hop
distances D. One can see that the lower densities λint yields
higher optimal throughputs, regardless of the multi-hop dis-
tance considered. Looking at the multi-hop distances, we find
that the lower the distance D, the higher the throughput T ∗.
4We have used the function LambertW(·) from the library SymPy [21].
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Fig. 2. Optimal multi-hop throughput T ∗, given by (9), as a function of
the density of interferers λint for different values of multi-hop distance D,
considering α = 4.
Although those results are somehow expected, it is interest-
ing to analyze the reasons behind this behavior, which will
later help us to understand the solution of the constrained
optimization. From (7), the optimal value of β∗ is independent
of any other parameter of the system, but the path-loss
exponent α, which is not under the designer control. Therefore,
β∗ is fixed if α is fixed and the single-hop distance d∗ is the
variable that changes with λint and/or D, as indicated by (8).
Equation (9) shows that the optimal throughput T ∗ is
inversely proportional to λint and D. It is worth noting that
for small values of D and/or λint, T ∗ tends to infinity. This is
a byproduct of our assumptions and clearly does not represent
actual scenarios. Although, we understand this limitation, we
still believe that the simplicity of our results can provide clear,
and reasonable, guidelines on the network design.
When the same λint is considered, the optimal throughput
T ∗ is determined only by D: if a packet needs to travel
longer source-destination distances, the single-hops should be
surprisingly smaller to support the optimal coding rate β∗.
This happens because the smaller the single-hop distance, the
higher the SIR experienced by the receiver nodes. In this case,
having more shorter hops is statistically more advantageous
than having less longer hops. A similar analysis is also valid
when assessing the case when the same multi-hop distance is
assumed D and the intensity λint is varying.
Although the results showing that longer distances D and
higher intensity of interferer nodes λint degrade the throughput
are expected, the design choices (β∗, d∗) that optimize the
multi-hop throughput T are rather surprising. In the next
section, we will see how the secrecy constraint will affect the
optimal system design.
IV. CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION
Let us now focus on the optimization problem subject to the
secrecy constraint stated in (6). We first recall that the network
designer does not have any control on the eavesdropper
parameters so that λeav and βeav are input variables (i.e.
external factors).
Lemma 1: The secrecy constraint given by (6) can be
rewritten as
d ≤ dc ≤ D, (10)
where the new constraint dc is given by:
dc =
D log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
log(1− ) . (11)
Proof: We start by manipulating the secrecy constraint
from (6) as follows:
D
d
log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α + λeav
)
≥ log(1− ) ⇒
⇒
D log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α + λeav
)
log(1− ) ≥ d. (12)
We now use the fact that the single-hop must have a length
lower than or equal to the multi-hop d ≤ D and that the
distances are strictly positive to conclude this proof.
Proposition 2: The solution of the constrained opti-
mization problem stated in (6) is given in Proposi-
tion 1 with log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
≤ log(1 − ) ≤
D2λintκpi(βeav)
2/α log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
.
Proof: Let us start by considering the second part of the
secrecy constraint given by Lemma 1, namely dc ≤ D . If
log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
> log(1 − ), then dc > D, the
secrecy constraint is then violated and the problem has no
feasible solution.
In the case where log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
≤ log(1−), we
need to verify the constraint d ≤ dc. As stated in Proposition
1, the optimal choice of β∗ only depends on α. Therefore
we focus on the optimal single-hop distance d∗ given by (8):
the optimal solution can be only obtained if the inequality
d∗ =
1
Dλintκpi(β∗)2/α
≤ dc is satisfied.
Corollary 1: The solution of the constrained
optimization problem stated in (6) does not exist if
log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
> log(1− ) and then T ∗ = 0.
Proof: This proof follows from the first part of the proof
of Proposition 2, when log
(
λintκ(βeav)
2/α
λintκ(βeav)2/α+λeav
)
> log(1− )
implies that the problem has no feasible solution.
Remark 1: In the scenarios under investigation, the inequal-
ity d∗ ≤ dc holds due to the combination of the system
parameters and target variables.
From this remark and the analytic results previously stated,
the solution of optimization problem with secrecy constraint
only depends on the relation between dc and the multi-hop
distance D for the cases studied here. More specifically,
Corollary 1 tells us that the optimal solution exists if the
secrecy constraint  is achievable for the network density of
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Fig. 4. Optimal multi-hop throughput T ∗ as a function of the density
of interferers λint for D = 3, α = 4 and  = 10%. We consider the
unconstrained optimization given by (9) and the numerical solution of (6).
interferers λint, density of eavesdroppers λeav and their SIR
threshold βeav considered.
Fig. 3 (presented in the next page) shows the distance
constraint dc as a function of the eavesdroppers’ SIR threshold
βeav for different combination of densities λint and λeav. One
can see that lower SIR thresholds βeav cause the unfeasibility
of the optimal solution. As expected, if the eavesdroppers are
able to decode messages with low SIR, then their chance of
correctly decode the information of the legitimate link grows,
regardless of the densities λint and λeav.
The effects of λint and λeav are the following. The higher
the density of eavesdroppers λeav, the stricter is the distance
constraint dc. This is due to the fact that big values of λeav
lead to greater probabilities that a eavesdropper node is closer
to the legitimate link. This, in turn, requires a more stringent
dc to satisfy the secrecy constraint .
The increase of the density of interferers λint, on the other
hand, helps the secrecy of the legitimate link. This is in line
with the general literature on physical layer security (e.g. [22])
since higher λint leads to probabilistically lower SIR. This will
then result in more outages in the eavesdropper links, making
the distance constraint dc less stringent.
Fig. 4 shows an example of the optimal constrained multi-
hop throughput5, in relation to the unconstrained case. The
optimal multi-hop throughput T ∗ is plotted as a function of
λint for D = 3, α = 4 and  = 10%. One can verify that
the constrained optimization can achieve the unconstrained
performance if the solution of the problem is within its
feasibility region, which can be analytically determined as
predicted in Corollary 1.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT ASPECTS
As previously mentioned, the scenario under analysis is a
simplified, abstract, version of an actual industrial communi-
5To solve the constrained optimization, we have used the numerical function
fmin l bfgs b from the library SciPy [23].
cation network. In any case, we would like to reinforce the
value of our results, which are simple enough to characterize
important trade-offs on the system design. In the proposed
model, we do not assume any information about interferers and
(malicious) eavesdroppers, which might be a more practical
consideration. For example, the design of a physical-layer
secured network assumes some information about eavesdrop-
pers as in [9], [11]. Therein, each transmitter attempts to
convey its message in a reliable and confidential way, once
they are aware that non-intended receivers may be overhearing
their transmission. In the case of interference, there are well-
established approaches that uses the channel and/or location
information to increase the system throughput.
In what follows, we briefly discuss some of the major
standardization efforts, which could benefit from our results.
For instance, ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) and Bluethooth (Low
Energy) network standards serve not only for industrial appli-
cations, but also for home automation for instance [7], [24].
Both standards are low-power and have limited communication
range (few tens of meters in indoor environment), and thus
could take advantage of our guidelines: a large number of
hops in short range communication is preferable over long
hops. Another possible alternative for wireless industrial is
WirelessHART [24], which has already embedded functional-
ities that allow information relaying.
It is worthy noting that our discussions so far are based
on industrial environments; however, our results also extend
to modern (smart) power grids due to the similarities of the
communication environment. For instance, smart grids also
present a distinct profile of interference due to the highly
reflective materials and electromagnetic interference from the
machinery, especially at distribution side. Besides, commu-
nication links suffer additional interference from concurrent
transmissions from neighboring devices and aggregations as
discussed in [25]. This initial assessment is then extended in
order to include not only reliability analysis but also security
and privacy in [26]. This evinces the potential applications and
relevance of our results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
This paper analyzes the throughput of industrial multi-
hop machine-to-machine networks under a secrecy constraint.
The scenario under analysis consists in an aggregator node,
which collects and processes the sensor measurements, and
a control unit that needs the proceeded information. This
communication is wireless and may occur over multiple hops,
and the communication engineer is expected to find the
optimal position of the relay nodes and the coding rates used
in the single-hop links so as to maximize the throughput in
[bits/s/Hz] while respecting a given secrecy constraint.
By employing our stochastic-geometric-based model to
characterize the uncertainties involved in the eavesdroppers’
and interferers’ positions, we first showed that the optimal
choice without any secrecy constraint of coding rate (spectral
efficiency) depends only on the path-loss exponent and nor-
mally assumes high value. To sustain such high rate, a great
number of shorter hops are then preferable to a small number
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Fig. 3. Distance constraint dc as a function of the eavesdroppers’ SIR threshold βeav for different combination of densities λint and λeav, assuming
the path-loss exponent α = 4 and secrecy constraint  = 10%. We consider the multi-hop distance D = 3 that is presented by the red line. When the
dc ≤ D = 3, then the optimal solution of (6) exists and it is given by Proposition 1.
of longer hops. When the secrecy constraint is assumed, we
proceeded with the throughput optimization and proved that
the unconstrained performance can be achieved with the same
optimal relay positions and coding rates only if a feasible
solution exists. Otherwise, there is no solution for the problem
that satisfies the minimum level of secrecy required.
As a next step, we expect to evaluate our guidelines in actual
industrial environments by following the insights provided
herein. To do so, we aim at designing a feasible experimental
deployment that utilizes established standards for industrial
wireless systems. It is also important to point out that, al-
though this analysis has been presented focusing on industrial
deployments, our framework can be also extended to different
kind of smart applications such as homes, cities, energy grids
or highways.
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